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CRITIQUE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION IN HOLMES V. VORNADO*
Kenneth C. Bass, III, and Linda E. Alcom**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Spring 2003 issue of this journal included a practice
note assessing the impact that the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Holmes v. Vornado might have on the practices of
appellate lawyers who are not specialists in patent litigation.'
This article analyzes Holmes from a different perspective. We
will first discuss the fundamental flaws in the Court's
decision-flaws that were perhaps induced by a failure of
appellate counsel to pay close attention to the jurisdictional
facts. We will also discuss the implications of the decision from
the perspective of practitioners who focus on intellectual
property trials and appeals. In the process we will explore the
intricacies of the unique jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.
The Holmes case was little noticed as it progressed through
the judicial system, being largely eclipsed by the
contemporaneous and widely followed Festo litigation.2 Holmes
* © 2003 Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C. All rights reserved.
** Mr. Bass and Ms. Alcorn are attorneys in the Washington, D.C., firm of Sterne, Kessler,
Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C. This paper reflects only the present considerations and views of
the authors, which should not be attributed to Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C., or
to any of its present or former clients. A prior version was presented at the Sedona
Conference on Patent Litigation in November 2002.
1. See Peter 0. Huang, The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems,
Inc.: The Return of Patent Appeals to the Regional Circuits, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process 197
(2003) (discussing The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S.
826 (2002)).
2. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
Like Holmes, Festo was presented as a case where the Federal Circuit had failed to follow
Supreme Court precedents, and in both cases the Supreme Court disagreed with the Federal
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall 2003)
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
may, however, turn out to be at least as significant. The issue in
Holmes was whether the Federal Circuit or the appropriate
regional court of appeals has jurisdiction over a case that
involves a patent counterclaim. The law on point had been
settled since the Federal Circuit held in Aerojet-General
Corporation v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd.,'
that such appeals are to come before it. That practice appears
never to have been seriously challenged until the plaintiff's
counsel in Holmes decided to question it. Indeed, the issue was
regarded as so well-settled that it was not even addressed by the
Federal Circuit when it decided the appeal that resulted in the
Supreme Court's decision to grant review.
The change in law wrought by Holmes rests on a tenuous
base. Justice Scalia's majority opinion adopts his oft-invoked
literalist methodology and rests on a linguistic analysis. The
opinion thus eschews any reliance on the policy impact of the
Court's decision, but even the linguistic analysis employed is
faulty at its core. The opinion fails to quote and consider the
most relevant language of the pertinent statute, focuses on the
wrong words in that statute, and ultimately fails to consider the
linchpin of a proper linguistic analysis. But these deficiencies
cannot, in fairness, be attributed solely to the Court. None of the
appellate counsel focused on the details of the jurisdictional
statute that framed the appellate issue.4 Despite these apparent
errors, however, the decision will remain as controlling law,
providing litigation counsel with a potent new weapon that
allows them effectively to avoid the Federal Circuit and channel
patent cases to their favorite regional court of appeals.
Circuit's analysis. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the Supreme Court's Festo decision
was unanimous and its Holmes decision resulted in three separate opinions. In the Federal
Circuit, the decisions followed precisely the opposite pattern: Festo was decided by a
deeply divided en banc court while Holmes was decided in a brief per curiam decision that
did not address the issue that the Supreme Court eventually decided.
3. 895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
4. Supreme Court counsel for both parties had handled the case below. They might in
consequence have believed that the case included no unresolved jurisdictional issues. See
Br. of Pet., The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826
(2002) (available at 2002 WL 24105); Br. of Respt., The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (available at 2002 WL 225890); Reply Br.
of Pet., The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002)
(available at 2002 WL 417307); Tr. of Oral Argument, The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (available at 2002 WL 485037).
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II. BACKGROUND
On its face the decision in Holmes seems reasonable and
correct. A proper evaluation of the opinion, however, requires
consideration of the history of the specific case as well as the
prior Supreme Court and Federal Circuit decisions, and that
consideration suggests a different conclusion.
A. The Parties and the Prior Litigation
The Supreme Court's decision in Holmes is the latest round
in a ten-year battle between Vornado and its competitors.
Vornado's corporate history began in the 1940s with the
manufacture of fans in Wichita, Kansas.5 In 1990 it obtained a
patent 6 for a fan front-grill design with a series of spiral vanes,
and it marketed the model incorporating this feature as having
its "Patented AirTensity® Grill." In 1992, Vornado filed an
action against one of its competitors, the Duracraft Corporation,
alleging that a Duracraft fan infringed Vornado's trade dress in
the configuration of its spiral grill design, but failing to assert a
claim for patent infringement. The trial court found that
Duracraft's fan infringed Vornado's trade dress,7 but the Tenth
Circuit reversed, holding that because the claimed trade dress
was "a significant inventive component" of a utility patent, it
could not also be protected under the Lanham Act.8
In November 1999 Vornado filed a complaint with the
International Trade Commission, claiming that Holmes was
importing fans that infringed Vornado's patent as well as the
trade dress that had been litigated in Duracraft.9 Holmes parried
with a complaint in the United States District Court in Kansas,
5. An abbreviated history of the company can be found by clicking the "Our
Philosophy" button on the Vomado website at http://www.vomado.com/about.html
(accessed on Nov. 6, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
6. U.S. Patent No. 4,927,324, issued in 1990 and reissued in 1994 as U.S. Patent No.
Re34,55 1.
7. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 1994 WL 1064319 (D. Kan.
Mar. 4, 1994).
8. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th
Cir. 1995).
9. See The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d
1140, 1141 (D. Kan. 2000) (summarizing procedural background).
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seeking a declaratory judgment that its fan did not infringe
Vornado's trade dress, and asserting a variety of claims based on
Vornado's advertising and the institution of the ITC
proceedings.' ° Holmes argued that Vornado was estopped by
virtue of the Duracraft decision from alleging protectible trade
dress, but apparently avoided making a claim for a declaratory
judgment that its product did not infringe Vornado's patent."
Vornado's riposte was a compulsory counterclaim in the Kansas
court alleging patent infringement. 2
B. The Trial Court Decision
Holmes moved for summary judgment on a theory of
collateral estoppel, arguing that the Tenth Circuit's Duracraft
decision precluded Vornado's assertion of trade-dress
protection. The court agreed, entering summary judgment in
favor of Holmes on this issue,'3 and granting the parties' joint
motion to enter partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The parties then agreed to a
conditional dismissal of Vornado's counterclaim that allowed
Vornado to appeal the adverse trade-dress decision and, if
successful on appeal, to reinstate its patent counterclaim."'
Vornado timely filed a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit.
The stage was thus set for the eventual Supreme Court decision,
but because familiarity with the relevant statutes and cases is
useful to an understanding of the appellate courts' decisions, we
turn first to a summary of those authorities.
C. The Statutes and the Precedents
1. The Statutes
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
"from a final decision of a district court of the United States...
10. Id. (The case was assigned to Judge Brown, who had tried Duracraft.)
11. Id. at 1142.
12. Id. at 1143.
13. Id. at 1144-45.
14. Br. of Pet., supra n. 4, at * 10 n. 8; Br. of Respt., supra n. 4, at *6.
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if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on
[28 U.S.C.] section 1338." ' Section 1338(a), in turn, provides
that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks." 16
2. The Cases
a. The Supreme Court's Decision in Christianson
The Supreme Court first addressed the interaction of these
two provisions in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating
Corp.,17 considering in that case whether appellate jurisdiction
over a long-running patent dispute lay with the Federal Circuit
or the regional circuit. In Colt, the plaintiff had obtained a
manufacturing license under a group of patents that covered
"certain specifications essential to the mass production of
interchangeable parts for the M16 rifle." Colt had, however,
used nondisclosure agreements as one means of concealing
many of the manufacturing specifications that might otherwise
have been revealed by the engineering drawings disclosed in the
patents." Christianson was a Colt employee who learned about
the secret specifications upon signing a nondisclosure
agreement, eventually left Colt, and then established a company
that "began selling M1 6 parts to various customers domestically
and abroad." '9 Colt sued him, seeking an injunction against his
further disclosure of the secret specifications and claiming that
he was violating his nondisclosure agreement.
The district court denied Colt's motion for an injunction,
and Colt voluntarily dismissed its claims, but it continued to
notify Christianson's customers that he was allegedly
misappropriating Colt's trade secrets.2 ° Christianson responded
by suing Colt under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, claiming
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2002) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2002) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
17. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
18. Id. at 804.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 805. The relevant patents had expired in 1980. Id.
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that Colt had illegally monopolized the market through reliance
on the patents.2 ' He claimed that the patents were invalid
because the specifications failed to disclose the essential
manufacturing details, and he specifically raised a patent-
invalidity issue.2
Christianson moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the patent failed to disclose the "best mode of enablement"
and was therefore invalid. The district court granted
Christianson's motion.23 Colt then appealed to the Federal
Circuit. After full briefing and argument, that court decided that
it did not have jurisdiction, and ordered the case transferred to
the Seventh Circuit.2 4 The Seventh Circuit responded by
deciding that the Federal Circuit decision was "clearly wrong,"
and ordered the appeal transferred back. 5 The Federal Circuit,
finding that the Seventh Circuit decision was itself "clearly
wrong," and that its decision reflected "a monumental
misunderstanding of the patent jurisdiction" of the Federal
Circuit, nonetheless proceeded to decide the merits "in the
interests of justice," and reversed the district court.26
Christianson sought and obtained review by the Supreme Court.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion sided with the Federal
Circuit. The Supreme Court held that appellate jurisdiction was
determined solely by reference to the district court's jurisdiction,
and resolution of that issue in turn rested on a proper
construction of § 1338(a). The central question, then, was how
to interpret the phrase "arising under" in § 1338. The Court
pointed to the long history of cases interpreting the identical
term in the general federal-question statute.27 Jurisdiction under
that statute exists only when "a well-pleaded complaint
establishes either that a federal law creates the cause of action or
that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on
21. Id. (recounting procedural history).
22. Id. at 806.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051 (7th Cir.
1986)).
26. Id. at 807 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544 (Fed.
Cir. 1987)).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2002) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
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resolution of a substantial question of federal law." 28 The Court
held in Christianson that "arising under" had the same meaning
in both statutes, and that jurisdiction under § 1338 existed only
if "patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded
claims" of the complaint.2 9
While a patent issue had been raised in Christianson's
complaint, and despite the fact that the disposition in the district
court rested entirely on resolution of that issue, the Court held
that success under the Sherman Act claim ,was not entirely
dependent on resolution of the patent issue. Jurisdiction, the
Court explained, did not "arise under" the patent laws "unless
patent law is essential to each of [the] theories" on which the
complaint was founded. ° Because some of the theories of
recovery in Christianson's complaint did not require resolution
of any patent issue, his complaint did not arise under § 1338,
and thus the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court therefore vacated the judgment of the Federal
Circuit and remanded with instructions to transfer the case, once
again, to the Seventh Circuit.3
Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's disposition, but
disagreed with the implication in the majority opinion that
appellate jurisdiction was to be determined solely by reference
to the claims asserted in the original complaint. He would
instead have looked to the claims actually tried, finding
appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit even if the original
complaint did not assert a patent claim, so long as a subsequent
express or implicit amendment result in adjudication of a patent
claim.32 Similarly, he concluded that jurisdiction lay with the
regional circuit if the original complaint asserted a patent claim
that was ultimately abandoned by the plaintiff in favor of other
non-patent federal claims, 33 noting that in Christianson's case a
28. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808 (quoting Fran. Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)).
29. Id. at 809.
30. Id. at 810.
31. Id. at 819.
32. Id. at 820 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (acknowledging that "if the
question is asked at the end of trial ..., the answer may be different than if it had been
asked at the outset").
33. Id. at 822 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
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patent issue had been determined, but the only claim actually
litigated was an antitrust claim. 4
b. The Federal Circuit's Decision in Aerojet-General
In Aerojet-General, the Federal Circuit faced the same
issue decided earlier in Christianson, but in a substantially
different context.'. The complaint in Aerojet did not assert any
patent claims, but the answer asserted a compulsory patent
counterclaim. Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit held that
appellate jurisdiction in such cases lay with it because the
compulsory counterclaim had its own separate jurisdictional
basis. It concluded that the district court's jurisdiction rested-at
least "in part"-on § 1338 in cases of this type.36 The Supreme
Court did not review the Aerojet-General decision, so it
remained the controlling precedent, at least for the Federal
Circuit, until the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes.
With this background in mind, we return to our analysis of
the last two appellate decisions addressing the dispute between
Holmes and Vornado.
D. The Appellate Proceedings in Holmes
1. The Federal Circuit
Vornado's brief in the Federal Circuit asserted appellate
jurisdiction on the basis of the Aerojet-General decision.37
Holmes did not move to dismiss the appeal, but did assert that
the appeal should be dismissed or transferred to the Tenth
Circuit for lack of jurisdiction.38 Shortly after the appeal was
argued, the Federal Circuit stayed further proceedings pending
the Supreme Court's decision in Traffix Devices, Inc. v.
Marketing Displays, Inc.,39 which was expected to resolve a
34. Id. at 824 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
35. See generally Aerojet-General, 895 F.2d 736.
36. Id. at 745.
37. Br. of Respt., supra n. 4, at * I (noting jurisdictional basis for proceeding below).
38. Br. of Pet., supra n. 4, at *I I (describing arguments made below).
39. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
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conflict between the Federal Circuit's interpretation of
protectible trade dress and the Tenth Circuit's view as expressed
in Vornado I.
Soon after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Traffix,
the Federal Circuit issued a brief order remanding the Holmes
case to the District Court in Kansas with a direction "to consider
whether the 'change in the law' exception to collateral estoppel
applies in view of the Traffix decision., 40 The Federal Circuit
did not address the jurisdictional issue, presumably concluding
that it was controlled by the Aerojet-General rule. The Supreme
Court granted Holmes a writ of certiorari to review the Federal
Circuit's decision on the jurisdictional issue.4'
2. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit, holding
that the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction under § 1295 was to be
determined solely by reference to the face of the complaint and
not by reference to the counterclaim.42 Justice Scalia's majority
opinion thus rejected the Aerojet-General rule, which had
prevailed for more than ten years.
Justice Stevens concurred separately in the judgment,
concluding-as he had in Christianson-that the focus should
be on the jurisdiction of the district court at the time of the
appeal, and not on the face of the complaint. He would,
however, look to the plaintiff's claims as actually adjudicated,
not solely to the original unamended complaint.43 Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justice O'Connor, concluded that the
Aerojet-General decision was sound, and that when a patent
claim was asserted as a compulsory counterclaim, then the
jurisdiction of the district court did rest-at least "in part"--on
a claim under the patent law." However, since "no patent claim
40. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 13 Fed. Appx. 961 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
41. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 534 U.S. 1016 (2001).
42. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 830 (pointing out that "it is undisputed that petitioner's well
pleaded complaint did not assert any claim arising under federal patent law," and
concluding that the Federal Circuit had erred in taking jurisdiction of the case).
43. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 835-37 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
44. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 839 (Ginsburg & O'Connor, JJ, concurring in the judgment).
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was actually adjudicated" by the trial court in Holmes, she
concurred in the majority's judgment that the Federal Circuit did
not have appellate jurisdiction .
III. CRITIQUE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION IN HOLMES,
The Supreme Court's decision changes more than a decade
of patent litigation practice. It provides litigators with an
opportunity to engage in appellate forum shopping. And it is
flawed at its foundation because the Court, as well as counsel,
failed to focus on the relevant language of the statutory
provisions. The Holmes case did not actually present the
question the Supreme Court decided, and so the appeal should
have been dismissed because certiorari was improvidently
granted. But "should have beens" do not alter what has been,
and the decision will remain as the governing law, unless
Congress is persuaded to restore the Aerojet-General rule.
A. Critique
1. Justice Scalia 's Approach
Justice Scalia's majority opinion adopts what might be
characterized as a strict literalist construction of the statutory
language, read in light of the judicial gloss placed on the same
words in another statute. The logic of the opinion is
straightforward: The appellate-jurisdiction statute refers to the
provisions of the district court's jurisdictional statute, and the
latter provides for jurisdiction when the case "arises under"
specific laws, including the patent laws.46 Since the phrase
"arises under" in a companion statute has a longstanding
judicial gloss, the rules of statutory construction dictate that
those words should have the same meaning in both statutes.47
Thus courts must look to the face of the complaint, and to only
45. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 840.
46. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1) (2002) (providing for Federal Circuit's jurisdiction),
1338(a) (providing for district courts'.jurisdiction) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
47. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("arising under") with 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (same).
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that source, to see whether in a specific case the district court's
jurisdiction was founded on § 1338 when deciding which
appellate tribunal has jurisdiction in a particular case.
For the moment, let's assume that this construction is the
right one. Applying it to the facts of the Holmes case, Justice
Scalia concluded that Holmes's complaint "did not include any
claim based on patent law," and that the rule therefore required
the Court to "vacate the judgment of the Federal Circuit and
remand the case with instructions to transfer the case to the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit."48 The preliminary
conclusion that the complaint did not assert a patent law claim
was clearly correct. However, the ultimate conclusion was
flawed because the Court failed to quote and consider the
complete language of § 1338.
When Justice Scalia quoted § 1338, he stated that "district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents ... . " That edited
version of the statute was the same one quoted repeatedly by the
parties in their briefs.0 But the complete language of the
provision-which only Holmes quoted in its brief, and then only
in passing '-refers to "any Act of Congress relating to patents,
plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks."' While
Holmes's complaint did not assert a patent claim, it did assert a
trade-dress claim, and trade-dress claims "arise under" § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act.53 Thus the Court was simply wrong in
concluding that the District Court's jurisdiction-determined
solely by reference to the original complaint-did not rest "in
whole or in part" on § 1338(a).
48. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 834.
49. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 829.
50. See Br. of Pet., supra n. 4, at *12 (referring only to "patents" and "plant variety
protection"), *14 (referring only to "patent"), *18 (referring only to "patents"); Br. of
Respt., supra n. 4, at *5 (referring only to "patent" ), *7 (referring only to "patents")' *10
(same).
51. See Br. of Pet., supra n. 4, at *15 (referring to "patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights, and trademarks").
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (emphasis added).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a). It is well settled that trade-dress cases arise under the Lanham
Act. See e.g. Wal-Mart v. Samara Bros., Inc, 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000) (indicating that in
addition to protecting registered trademarks, the Lanham Act gives a producer a cause of
action for the use by any person of his or her distinctive trade dress.)
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2. Counsel's Critical Oversight
The Court's error was admittedly induced by counsel.
Holmes's complaint alleged jurisdiction only under "15 U.S.C.
§ 1121, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332(a), and the principles of
supplemental jurisdiction codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367." 54
Whether the omission of a reference to § 1338(a) in the
complaint was intentional or not, it appears that neither of the
parties ever explicitly pointed out to either the Federal Circuit or
the Supreme Court that jurisdiction in the District Court was
based, at least in part, on an "Act of Congress relating to...
trademarks." This oversight may be understandable, as the
parties focused their attention on the patent counterclaim, but the
Supreme Court's failure to notice this fundamental error in its
analysis is troublesome.
Had counsel repeatedly quoted all of § 1338(a) and paid
closer attention to the appellate-jurisdiction issue, the Court
surely would have realized that the trade-dress claim arose under
the trademark law. 5 Had the Court been aware of this reality, it
should have concluded that the Federal Circuit had properly
exercised appellate jurisdiction, without regard for the validity
of the Aerojet-General rule.
Unfortunately, we cannot know why the Federal Circuit
concluded that it had jurisdiction, as the per curiam order
remanding the case to the District Court never addressed
Holmes's jurisdiction argument. 6 Perhaps the Federal Circuit,
given its expertise in patent and trademark law, well knew that
jurisdiction over trade-dress claims was based on § 1338(a) and
regarded Holmes's jurisdictional argument as frivolous. If so, it
54. Br. of Pet., supra n. 4, at *2 (summarizing Pl. Compl., The Holmes Group, Inc. v.
Vornado Circulation Sys., Inc., Civ. No. 00-1286 (D. Kan. Dec. 8, 1999)).
55. Justice Scalia himself wrote the opinion in Samara, in which the Court held that
proof of trade-dress infringement in product configuration cases required evidence of
secondary meaning. Interestingly, Justice Stevens noted when concurring in Holmes that
"other areas of intellectual property law are not infrequently bound up with patent
counterclaims," observing when he did so that the Holmes case involved those other
intellectual property claims. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 837. He also referred to the complete
language of § 1338 and noted the inclusion of trademark cases in that section. Id. He did
not, however, extend those observations to the ultimate conclusion that the district court's
jurisdiction over Holmes's original complaint should have been deemed to be based in part
on § 1338 because the complaint included a trade-dress claim.
56. Holmes, 13 Fed. Appx. 961.
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is unfortunate that the Federal Circuit did not say so in its order.
If this point had been the basis for the Federal Circuit's assertion
of appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court would almost
certainly not have granted a writ of certiorari. Moreover, had the
Supreme Court been alerted to the issue by counsel, it might
well have decided that the case was not a "proper vehicle" for
deciding to reverse the Aerojet-General rule, and could then
have dismissed the petition as improvidently granted.57
3. The Court's Critical Omission
Its failure to read the entire relevant statutory language of
§ 1338 was not the majority's only failure to pay close attention
to the precise language of the relevant statutory provisions.
Applying the established rule that when the same words are used
in different statutes they should generally be given the same
meaning, Justice Scalia pointed out that "§ 1295(a)(1) does not
itself use the term [arising under], but rather refers to § 1338." 5
He was mistaken. Section 1295(a)(1) provides, in its relevant
part:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final
decision of a district court of the United States ... if the
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on
section 1338 of [title 28], except that a case involving a
claim arising under any Act of Congress relating to
copyrights, exclusive rights in mask works, or trademarks
and no other claims under section 1338(a) shall be
[appealed to the regional circuit].59
Thus the critical jurisdictional provision does in fact use the
"arising under" terminology, but uses it to create an exception
to the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction. That court's jurisdiction
extends to any case in which jurisdiction in the district court was
based "in whole or in part" on § 1338. As Justice Stevens
57. It is never too late to raise such issues, and appellate counsel should not assume that
once cert has been granted, the Court will proceed to decide the case. It is, unfortunately,
all too common for jurisdictional issues to be overlooked in the cert petition stage, only to
emerge later when the merits are briefed or argued.
58. Hoines, 535 U.S. at 833 (emphasis in original).
59. § 1295(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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expressly noted, 6°  and as Justice Ginsburg implicitly
recognized,6' no linguistic legerdemain is required to conclude
that when a counterclaim arises under § 1338, at least "a part"
of the district court's jurisdiction is based on § 1338. It is not
insignificant that Congress used the "arising under" language to
limit the otherwise expansive scope of the jurisdictional grant so
that appeals in non-patent cases arising under § 1338 would
continue to go to the regional circuits.62 Given this explicit
reference to the established terminology, it is surprising that
Justice Scalia would overlook the language and mistakenly say
that the words were not there. Had he taken cognizance of the
precise language, he might have reached a different conclusion,
or he might at a minimum have had to provide a different
explanation for his literalist construction.
B. Consequences
It seems highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will revisit
its construction of § 1295. Unless Congress intervenes, then, the
patent litigation bar and the courts of appeal will follow the
Court's decision. Cases that do not present a patent claim in the
complaint, but that are nonetheless patent litigations in
substance, will be appealed in most cases to the regional circuits
and not to the Federal Circuit. That result is likely to lead to the
non-uniform treatment of patent issues that Congress wanted to
avoid when it created the Federal Circuit. This is a significant
change in the patent law, but the Supreme Court majority
60. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 836 n. I (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
61. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 839 (Ginsburg and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
62. It is also significant that Congress used the "arising under" phrase only once in the
exclusion. The exclusion refers to cases with non-patent claims "arising under" § 1338,
but omits from the exclusion any case that has "other claims under section 1338." Each of
those terms come into play in the Holmes case. If the customary meaning of "arising
under" in § 1331 jurisprudence is applied to § 1295, then the plaintiffs complaint did
"arise under" § 1338 because it included a trade-dress claim based on the Lanham Act.
The proviso would then be invoked because that claim was one "arising under an[] Act of
Congress relating to ... trademarks." But the exclusion to the provision would then be
invoked because the "case," which must necessarily refer to the entire case and not just the
initial complaint, did involve "other claims under 1338(a)" once Vornado interposed its
patent law counterclaim.
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appears consciously to have avoided considering its policy
implications.
1. The Legislative History
A fresh look at the legislative history surrounding the
creation of the Federal Circuit shows that the goals behind
formation of that court will be frustrated by the Court's decision
in Holmes. Congress created the Federal Circuit by merging two
existing Article III courts-the Court of Claims and Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. The three purposes of the act
establishing it were:
to fill a void in the judicial system by creating an appellate
forum capable of exercising nationwide jurisdiction over
appeals in areas of the law where Congress determines
there is a special need for nationwide uniformity;
to improve the administration of the patent law by
centralizing appeals in patent cases; and
to provide an upgraded and better organized trial forum for
government claims cases."
The legislative history of the Act demonstrates that a
driving force behind it was an effort to ease the burden on the
Supreme Court when there is a conflict among the circuits by
providing a single court that can provide "reasonably quick and
definitive answers to legal questions of nationwide
significance." 64 In patent cases in particular, the circuits were
reaching inconsistent decisions on the same issue, or applying
the law unevenly when faced with the facts of individual cases.
However, the Supreme Court at the time was "operating at-or
close to-full capacity,"" and so could not be expected to
resolve all of the resulting conflicts.
Congress determined that in the case of patent law there
was a special need for national uniformity. Based on the
evidence compiled by the Hruska Commission,66 Congress
63. Sen. Rep. No. 97-275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1981) [hereinafter Senate Report].
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id.
66. Senator Roman Hruska chaired the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System, which was popularly known as the Hruska Commission.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
concluded that in patent cases, the application of the law to the
facts often produced "different outcomes in different
courtrooms in substantially similar cases."6 7 Some circuit courts
were regarded as "pro-patent" and others as "anti-patent,"
which led to widespread forum shopping.68 The Commission
found that
[p]erceived disparities between the circuits have led to
"mad and undignified races" between alleged infringers
and patent holders to be the first to institute proceedings in
the forum they consider most favorable."
The Commission further noted that
[a]t present, the validity of a patent is too dependent upon
geography (i.e., the accident of judicial venue) to make
effective business planning possible. It is particularly
difficult for small businesses to make useful and
knowledgeable investment decisions where patents are
involved when they fear a patent may be tied up for years
in expensive litigation and when the standard of
patentability varies from circuit to circuit. A single court of
appeals for patent cases will promote certainty where it is
lacking to a significant degree and will reduce, if not
eliminate, the forum-shopping that now occurs.70
The legislative history of the Act indicated that the "basic
objective" of the Act was to provide for "uniformity of
doctrinal development in the patent area."7 Further, the
legislative history surmised that as the new court brought
uniformity to the patent law, "the number of appeals resulting
from attempts to obtain different rulings on disputed legal
points ... [could] be expected to decrease."72 A goal of
uniformity was to "strengthen the United States patent system in
67. Senate Report, supra n. 63, at 5 (citing Commn. on Revision of the Fed. Ct. App.
Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195,
214 (1975) (reporting, in addition, the comments of then-Justice Rehnquist, who expressed
concern about "litigants who are left at sea by conflicting decisions on questions of federal
law" )); see also id. at 361-76 (reporting comments of other interested parties).
68. H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. at 20-21 (1981) [hereinafter House
Report].
69. Id. at 21.
70. Id. at 22 (footnotes omitted).
71. Senate Report, supra n. 63, at 5.
72. Id.
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such a way as to foster technological growth and industrial
innovation." "
With respect to the issue of the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction, there was a concern that the court would
appropriate for itself other elements of federal law under its
grant of jurisdiction. For example, there was a fear that specious
patent claims would be tied to substantial antitrust claims in
order to create jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit. With regard to
this concern, the legislative history notes that
[t]he statutory language in question [28 U.S.C. § 1295]
requires that the district court have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1338. This is a substantial requirement.
Immaterial, inferential, and frivolous allegations of patent
questions will not create jurisdiction in the lower court, and
therefore there will be no jurisdiction over these questions
in the appellate court. As stated above, it is a canon of
construction that courts strictly construe their jurisdiction.
Therefore, the committee is confident that the present
language will not pose undue difficulties.
The Committee is concerned that the exclusive jurisdiction
over patent claims of the new Federal Circuit not be
manipulated. This measure is intended to alleviate the
serious problems of forum shopping among the regional
courts of appeals on patent claims by investing exclusive
jurisdiction in one court of appeals. It is not intended to
create forum shopping opportunities between the Federal
Circuit and the regional courts of appeals on other claims.
Thus, for example, mere joinder of a patent claim in a case
whose gravamen is antitrust should not be permitted to
avail a plaintiff of the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit in
avoidance of the traditional jurisdiction and governing legal
interpretations of a regional court of appeals. Federal
District judges are encouraged to use their authority under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Rules 13(i), 16,
20(b), 42(b), 54(b), to ensure the integrity of the
jurisdiction of the federal court of appeals by separating
final decisions on claims involving substantial antitrust
issues from trivial patent claims, counterclaims, cross-
73. House Report, supra n. 68, at 20.
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claims, or third party claims raised to manipulate appellate
jurisdiction.
The Committee intends for the jurisdictional language to be
construed in accordance with the objectives of the Act and
these concerns. If, for example, a patent claim is
manipulatively joined to an antitrust action but severed or
dismissed before final decision of the antitrust claim,
jurisdiction over appeal of the antitrust claim should not be
changed by this Act but should rest with the regional court
of appeals.
It appears from this last paragraph that Congress intended
the question of Federal Circuit jurisdiction to be decided at the
time of the appeal, and not at the time of filing of the complaint
in district court. Ironically, if the well-pleaded complaint rule
applied by the Court in Holmes were applied to the scenario
described above, jurisdiction would rest with the Federal Circuit,
and not with the regional court of appeals as was clearly
intended, because the complaint as filed included a patent claim.
2. Frustration of Congressional Goals
The goals of the act establishing the Federal Circuit will be
frustrated by the Court's decision in Holmes. First, the goal of
creating an appellate forum capable of exercising nationwide
jurisdiction over appeals in order to create uniformity in the area
of patent law will be frustrated because the regional circuits will
now decide issues of patent law. They will hear and decide
patent cases in which the patent issue is raised as a counterclaim
by the defendant.75
74. Senate Report, supra n. 63, at 19-20.
75. At the time of this writing, at least three cases containing issues of patent law have
been appealed to the regional circuits. See e.g. E.I DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Okuley,
344 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's application of 35 U.S.C. § 116 to
defendant's counterclaim concerning inventorship); Medigene AG v. Loyola U. of Chi., 41
Fed. Appx. 450 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (transferring appeal to Seventh Circuit "under the
principles established in Holmes"); Telcomm Technical Serv., Inc. v. Siemens Rolm
Commun., Inc., 295 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (transferring appeal to Eleventh Circuit
because patent-infringement issue was raised only in counterclaims) The Medigene case,
which became Appeal No. 02-2743 at the Seventh Circuit, was subsequently dismissed by
joint motion of the parties pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). Although oral arguments in
the Telcommn appeal were held on November 20, 2003, the case was still pending in the
Eleventh Circuit as Appeal No. 02-14131 -TT at the time of this writing.
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Second, the regional circuits will not be bound by Federal
Circuit precedent, and will be free to decide issues such as claim
construction, literal infringement, doctrine of equivalents and
invalidity without being bound by prior Federal Circuit case law
on these issues. Further, even if the regional circuits were to
follow the Federal Circuit precedent, each regional circuit will
interpret that precedent differently. Some regional courts will
limit the prior cases to their specific facts, and other regional
courts will interpret the cases to create broad, sweeping rules of
law. This will inevitably lead to conflicts among the circuits,
which the Supreme Court will be called upon to resolve with
increasing frequency.
One of the problems noted in the legislative history prior to
the formation of the Federal Circuit was that "the infrequency of
Supreme Court review of patent cases leaves the present judicial
system without any effective means of assuring even-
handedness nationwide in the administration of the patent
laws."" Unless the Supreme Court now plans to hear patent
cases with some frequency in order to resolve conflicts among
the circuits, the same uncertainty in the application of patent
laws will result from its decision in Holmes. At least one judge
on the Federal Circuit apparently agrees with this assessment,
because he has pointed out that the Federal Circuit applies its
own law on personal jurisdiction
in order to "promot[e] uniformity in the field of patent
law ..... " Although the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Systems, Inc. may make that uniformity more elusive, it is
still important.
These circuit conflicts will also re-create the problem of
forum shopping that was so prevalent prior to the formation of
the Federal Circuit. After Holmes, if a plaintiff files a lawsuit
expecting a patent counterclaim to be filed, it will choose a
district court whose regional court of appeals is anti-patent.
Also, in many legitimate patent disputes in which a patentee has
notified an alleged infringer of a possible claim against it, the
alleged infringer will be more inclined to file an action based on
76. House Report, supra n. 68, at 22.
77. Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., 294 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Dyk, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
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non-frivolous claims of tortious interference, product
disparagement, or other claims that counsel knows will
precipitate a patent infringement counterclaim. The infringer's
lawyers will thus not only be able to choose the district court in
which patent litigation will begin,7" they will be able to choose
the appellate tribunal as well. It is not clear how significant this
potential will be, but it seems likely to have at least some effect
on the course of patent litigation across the country.
This forum shopping will weaken the patent system
because uncertainty as to the value and enforceability of patents
will make business planning more difficult. It may also stifle the
innovative process, for corporations facing the risk that a patent-
infringement claim will be decided by a regional circuit that is
anti-patent may start to question the value of obtaining patents at
all.
3. State-Court Jurisdiction as an Unforeseen Consequence
A further result of the Court's decision, one that may not
have been foreseen, is application of the Holmes interpretation
of the "arising under" provision as a basis for finding subject-
matter jurisdiction in state courts. In cases that include
counterclaims arising under federal law, for example, a federal
district court could rely on Holmes to remand to state courts
even cases that include a patent-infringement counterclaim.7 9
State courts could apply Holmes broadly to extend beyond cases
involving patent counterclaims, such that they might also reach
the conclusion that there is no need to bifurcate a case that
includes a counterclaim under the Copyright Act, because under
Holmes there is no exclusive federal jurisdiction over such
counterclaims. ° State courts could also conclude that state-law
78. Use of the declaratory judgment procedure can in many cases allow the alleged
infringer to determine the venue of the infringement action against it.
79. See e.g. R.F. Shinn Contractors, Inc. v. Shinn, 2002 WL 31942135 (M.D.N.C. Nov.
8, 2002).
80. See e.g. Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784 (Ind. 2002). This
result is an extension of the Court's interpretation of "arising under" in Hohnes to the
Copyright Act, because causes of action arising in the first instance under the Copyright
Act may be decided only in the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2002) (granting
exclusive jurisdiction to federal district courts in copyright cases) (available at
http://uscode.house.gov).
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claims for breach of a patent-license warranty can proceed in
state court so long as the complaint fails to include a challenge
to the patent's validity.8'
IV. CONCLUSION
The consequence of Holmes is not to improve the
administration of the patent law by centralizing appeals, but
rather to create a disparate and unorganized approach to the
application and interpretation of the patent law. The authors fear
that patent jurisprudence will in consequence devolve into a
quagmire similar to the one that preceded the creation of the
Federal Circuit.
The Supreme Court majority apparently understood that
confusion of this sort was likely to result from its decision in
Holmes, but rejected its implications, insisting that its task was
"not to determine what would further Congress's goal of
ensuring patent-law uniformity, but to determine what the words
of the statute must fairly be understood to mean." 82 This strictly
literal approach to statutory construction is excessively rigid in
its expectations of precision, ignores the all too frequent
elasticity in Congressional language, and is in consequence
problematic enough when correctly applied. When it is applied
with inadequate intellectual rigor-as it was in Holmes-it can
easily lead to unfortunate consequences.
The authors believe the patent system is not well served by
decisions like Holmes that create different rules for the Federal
Circuit and the regional circuits, compromising the
Congressional vision of national uniformity. They believe in
addition that the possibility of such conflicts is now increased,
for Holmes encourages litigators to frame their complaints in a
way calculated to avoid review by the Federal Circuit and
enables them when filing those complaints to choose potentially
more favorable courts of appeals instead. They hope that the
resulting forum shopping and conflicts among the regional
81. Data Recognition Corp. v. Scan-Optics, Inc., 2003 WL 1962252 (Minn. App. Apr.
29, 2003).
82. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 833.
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circuits will soon prompt Congress to restore the Aerojet-
General rule.
